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Judicial
Temperament,
Explained

BY TERRY A. MARONEY

Judicature

[I]t seems to me that temperament is
the key to everything else that one does
on the bench.1
Elusive as it is important,
judicial temperament is notoriously
hard to define.2

JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT IS SOMETHING WE THINK ALL JUDGES
MUST HAVE: We assess it at all critical junctures of a judge’s career.3 At
the same time, judicial temperament is
something no one can quite put a finger
on. Most often, we simply list desirable
qualities and behaviors without articulating what, if anything, unifies them.4
Most lists include courtesy, patience,
and compassion, but no two lists are
the same — and, at the extreme, they
capture virtually all aspects of a judge’s
personal makeup (e.g., “personality,
character, upbringing and education,
formative career experiences, work
habits, and behavior when interacting
with others”).5
The other approach is to treat judicial temperament as a fundamentally
mysterious quality that one does or
doesn’t have. For example, when asked
whether there was an ideal judicial
temperament, the late Justice Antonin
Scalia (in his characteristically pithy
manner) replied, “If there is one, I don’t
have it.”6 His successor Neil Gorsuch
got the opposite — but equally conclusory — assessment, at one point being
dubbed “Scalia without the scowl.”7
Both approaches — laundry list
and cipher — do a deep disservice to
a critical measure of judicial fitness.
Temperament is not everything we
look for; we also value intellect, integrity, and adequate legal training. But if
we place temperament among our core
criteria, we cannot leave its meaning
indeterminate.
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Because judicial temperament is
essentially a psychological construct, I
propose that we ought to use psychology to understand it. In psychology,
temperament refers to relatively stable, trait-level individual differences
in emotional habits that underlie the
ways in which different people react to,
and cope with, similar situations.8 This
way of thinking about human temperament is the key to understanding
judicial temperament.
Here, in a nutshell, is what psychology
suggests about judicial temperament. If
it does not all click immediately, don’t
worry: The remainder of this article
will walk through the underlying ideas
and their implications for judges.
By the time they are old enough
to take the bench, judges will have
a relatively coherent, stable set
of strengths and weaknesses in
core temperamental traits. Those
traits revolve around two factors:
habitual patterns of emotional
experience (say, tendencies toward
positive emotions like satisfaction and compassion, or negative
ones like fear or anger) and of emotional regulation (say, tendencies
toward thinking and talking things
through, stuffing feelings down,
or lashing out). The most generally
advantageous temperamental profiles
will reflect moderate to high levels of
positive emotionality, combined with
moderate to high levels of self-regulatory capacity. Such traits would be
predicted to help judges meet the job’s
many challenges with resilience, and to
support consistent displays of patience,
compassion, respect, level-headedness,
and openness. The most generally disadvantageous profiles will reflect high
levels of negative emotionality, coupled
with low levels of regulatory capacity. Such traits would be predicted to
lead judges to cope poorly over time,

and to support displays of impatience,
disrespect, disdain, volatility, and
defensiveness (and, in some instances,
indecision and a lack of courage).
There is no fixed template, but ideally
all judges ought to clear the baseline
of having at least some trait positivity (particularly kindness) and at least
moderate self-regulatory capacity, and
avoiding the extremes of negative emotionality (particularly anger).
Judges can improve on aspects of
their temperaments but cannot be
expected to fundamentally reorient or
transcend them. Temperament will be
an important determinant of a judge’s
behavior, its relative importance
varying from relatively weak where

Judges can improve
on aspects of their
temperaments but
cannot be expected
to fundamentally
reorient or
transcend them.
environmental constraints are high
(say, immediate and salient rewards for
desired behaviors, even those that are
inconsistent with one’s own temperament, and consequences for undesired
behaviors, even those consistent with
one’s temperament) and stress low,
to very strong when constraints are
weak and stress high. Rather than
think of someone having or not having
a judicial temperament, we should ask
which, if any, specific judicial positions
are a good fit with his or her temperament. We also should develop sound
methods for helping all judges maximize advantageous aspects of their

u
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temperaments, and for creating courts
that incentivize and support desired
behaviors in light of the predictable
range of judges’ temperaments.
Temperament is not everything.
Judges will bring to the bench other
personality traits, habits, qualities,
and characteristics, including diverse
levels of intellect, integrity, and legal
training. Judges also will bring differing declarative beliefs, such as levels
of commitment to diversity and equality. A judge’s abilities and beliefs are
vitally important to maintaining the
perceived and actual fairness of the
courts, but they are not rooted in
temperament.
Judicial temperament thus should be
understood to refer to a deep-seated,
relatively stable set of specific personal traits — separable from intellect,
training, and ideology — that, in dialectic with specific judicial environments
and the predictable demands of judging, drive behaviors that affect how
justice is delivered and perceived.
Now, let’s back up.
LAYING THE FOUNDATION
Why do we care about judicial temperament? The basic logic is that
temperament is an underlying factor that produces behaviors, some
desired and some not. The behaviors
most often cited as evidence of a good
temperament — displays of courtesy,
patience, level-headedness, and caring
— are desirable because they advance
procedural justice.9 They make litigants, attorneys, and the public feel
heard and understood, foster respect
for the courts, and — when displayed
to fellow judges — advance collegiality.
In contrast, the behaviors most often
cited as evidence of a poor temperament — outsized or misplaced anger
displays, discourtesy, impatience, and
callousness — foster feelings of alien-
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ation from and distrust of the courts,
and create acrimony within them. One
underlying principle, then, is that judicial temperament — whatever it is
— is a causal force driving productive
or destructive behaviors in the daily
work of judging.
The daily work of judging, for its part,
is broad and varied. Judges interpret
the law and what it requires, exercise
discretion, credit versions of reality,
and accord deference to other institutional actors; these aspects of judging
are widely studied. However, judges
also interact with the public, lawyers,
litigants, jurors, witnesses, clerks,
court staff, and one another. They are
colleagues, employees, employers,
subordinates, and supervisors; some
are court managers, civic role models,
and public intellectuals. Temperament
is relevant to the full sweep of what
judges do, including the under-studied parts — like how they handle the
job’s inherent challenges and how they
treat people along the way.
We care about judicial temperament, then, because it captures some
cluster of personal attributes that
make certain behaviors more or less
likely in a wide variety of work tasks.
Desired behaviors involve qualities
of presence, connection, and caring,
as the actions they promote communicate the proper role of courts in a
democracy and enable their smooth
functioning. Undesired behaviors
involve qualities of distance, disconnection, and aversion, as the actions
they promote damage the courts’
image and operation. The search for
judicial temperament is a search for
the underlying factors that make one
judge display the former and another
the latter.

A CRASH COURSE IN
HUMAN TEMPERAMENT
Core principles of human temperament, summarized here, provide the
compass for that search.
Let’s start by thinking of a family that
has two biological children, close in age
and raised in a similar home environment. These children are, from birth,
extremely different in how they tend
to act in and react to the world. These
patterns of action and reaction are
traits, and each child’s bundle of traits
is their temperament. Temperament
is divided along two trait axes. The
first is emotional reactivity (also called
“trait emotionality”), which refers to
early-appearing, durable patterns of
emotional attitudes, experiences, and
reactions. The second is self-regulation
(also called “effortful control”), which
refers to similarly deep and durable patterns of managing emotions,
impulses, and behavior. One child,
for example, may startle easily when
encountering something new (e.g., a
clown at a birthday party) and have difficulty self-soothing, while the other
reacts with curiosity and easily calms
when upset. Traits are like dimmer
switches: Every person sits somewhere on a continuum for every trait.
The poor self-soother, for example, is
not utterly incapable of self-regulation; she just sits low on the regulatory
continuum.
The combination of one’s positions
on trait continua creates a relatively
stable, distinct temperamental profile,
which then interacts with situations
to produce behavior. The line between
temperament and behavior is particularly direct when the person is under
stress, and where there are few salient
constraints to motivate acting differently. Thus, both children are capable
of a wide variety of behaviors, depending on the situation, but their parents
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know which form each child’s center
of gravity. Those are the ones most
rooted in temperament.
These reactivity and regulation traits
are the “building blocks that underlie
development of individual differences in
personality” as an adult.10 Environment
plays a crucial role: “different life histories create different personalities” even
“in children born with the same temperament.”11 Over time, temperament both
shapes and is shaped by many factors —
culture; family dynamics; friendships;
financial security; differential expectations according to variables such as
gender and race; exposure to illness
and violence; and so on. Some earlyappearing traits will persist through
the forge of our formative years and
others will not, and how they persist
will vary. However, the range of change
is not infinite:
[O]ne’s temperament imposes a
restraint on the possible outcomes.
A low-reactive infant might
become a trial lawyer, investment
banker, navy pilot, or criminal, but
it is unlikely that he will become
a frightened recluse. Condensed
water vapor can, depending on
local conditions, form a white billowy cloud, a mackerel sky, or a
dense ground fog, but it cannot
become an asteroid.12
Temperament “eliminates many
more possibilities than it determines,”
creating an “envelope of possibility”
within which we all, by adulthood, will
have developed.13
The grown-up iteration of our temperament will be just one aspect (if a
particularly important one) of a complex, varied personality.14 Further, that
temperamental aspect can continue to
grow and change within our remaining envelope of possibility. However,
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growth curves will have flattened significantly, particularly by middle age;
certain types of change will be easier
and more predictable than others (for
example, emotional regulation skill
tends to tick upward in older adults);
and dramatic change will be just as
unlikely as it ever was. Finally,
many of our distinguishing
qualities are not part of temperament and personality at
all, such as intelligence, learned
skills, “acquired knowledge,
opinions, [and] beliefs.”15 When
our hypothetical siblings (now
in middle age) argue over partisan politics at the Thanksgiving
table, the content of that argument is not temperamental.
How they argue, however, and
how each recovers from the
argument, is.
Here is where our crash course in
human temperament leaves us as we
prepare to turn our attention squarely
back to its implications for judges.
We (fortunately) do not need to
examine judges’ childhoods to understand judicial temperament. We have
both the luxury and the necessity of
looking at the person who either wants
to be a judge or already is one, and that
person is likely approaching, in, or past
middle age. That person will come
with a relatively stable temperamental
profile, seen through “individual differences in the tendency to behave, think,
and feel in certain ways,”16 which has
emerged through their life experiences, as bounded by their envelope
of possibility. A judge’s temperament
might change somewhat over a judicial career but cannot be expected to
change fundamentally.
Each judge’s temperament will
interact with a distinct judicial environment — the specific parameters of
their job, the sorts of situations that

typify it, and the cultures (both courthouse and community) within which it
is embedded — to produce behaviors.
Temperament’s behavioral influence
is likely to be particularly visible when
judges are in stressful situations with
few salient constraints on behavior.

Temperament
“eliminates many more
possibilities than it
determines,” creating an
“envelope of possibility”
within which we all,
by adulthood, will
have developed.
Finally, judges are more than their
temperaments. They have particular levels of intellect and legal
training, political and judicial philosophies, career goals, spiritual beliefs,
moral commitments, and family lives.
When we look at a judge as a whole
package, that whole package matters.
But when we look to his or her judicial temperament, we are looking at
the part of the package that maps onto
psychological concepts of temperament. That part is real, it is predictive
of behavior, and it is only imperfectly
malleable.
JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT,
EXPLAINED
The importance of judicial temperament has not eluded us — but its precise
nature has, because we haven’t used the
appropriate tools to understand it. Let’s
now dig deeper, focusing on the specific traits that would be predicted to be
most and least likely to produce desired
behaviors in judging environments.

u
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Imagine that the two children have
grown up and become judges. One
day they are in their respective courtrooms, each interacting with a lawyer
who makes an argument after being
instructed not to. One judge, furious at being disobeyed, barks sharply,
startling everyone, then quickly feels
embarrassed and mumbles at the
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Positive emotionality is a plus. Judges
with strength in the “positive emotionality” family of traits would be predicted
to display desirable judicial behaviors —
expressions of compassion, patience,
humility, respect, and open-mindedness — most consistently and in the
greatest variety of work settings.
Persons high in positive emotionality tend with relative ease
to connect with feelings such
as pleasure, joy, interest, and
excitement. They may gravitate
toward lower-intensity versions (e.g., calm satisfaction) or
higher-intensity ones (e.g., exuberance and sensation-seeking).
In either iteration, positivity
buffers against depression, promotes resilience and longevity,
and enhances social competence.
Further,
dispositionally
positive
persons tend to have a broadened perspective on their own thoughts and
actions, as well as those of others, in
contrast to the “narrowed mindsets
sparked by negative emotions.”17
Kindness is part of this trait family.
Trait kindness refers not to specific
acts, which may not be appropriate
in any given situation, but rather to
a deep-seated “constellation of positive attitudes, feelings, and behaviors
toward others,” including compassion,
“empathy, prosocial behavior, generosity, and altruism.”18 One might think
of this trait as measuring differential
tendencies to approach the world with
agape, or love for humanity.
Moderate to high levels of temperamental positivity, including kindness,
should be understood as critical determinants of a good judicial temperament.
High-positivity judges will not feel
happy, hopeful, and generous at all
times, nor should they. These would be
abnormal reactions to many situations
— particularly in judging, which usually

Strength in positivity
traits would be
expected to buffer
against judicial
cynicism and despair.
lawyer to continue with a different
argument. The other judge, mildly disappointed in the lawyer’s ineptitude,
calmly halts the proceeding, talks quietly but firmly in a sidebar, and waits
to see if the behavior repeats. In both
courtrooms, court staff exchange
knowing looks: This is how their judge
usually acts when things like that happen. Their predictably contrasting
reactions to, and handling of, similar
situations likely reflect temperamental differences in both reactivity and
self-regulation.
Emotional reactivity traits
Recall that one temperamental axis is
emotional reactivity, capturing both
the speed and intensity with which
one reacts to stimuli — for example,
something novel or frightening — and
the content of those reactions — for
instance, feelings of anger, sadness,
fear, or joy. Certain emotionality traits
are likely to promote desired judicial
behaviors, while others are likely to do
the opposite.

requires mucking about in some sort of
unhappiness or acrimony, ranging from
broken families to broken contracts.
Positivity will not bathe sad or conflictual realities in golden sunshine.
However, strength in positivity traits
would be expected to buffer against
judicial cynicism and despair. The work
of judging often shows humanity at its
worst. To perform that work well over
time requires a fundamental disposition to believe in humanity’s essential
decency, and a propensity to care about
the public being served. Indeed, tributes to great judges typically praise
their benevolence. One much-beloved
judge wrote that “[i]f we judges could
possess but one attribute, it should be
a kind and understanding heart. The
bench is no place for cruel or callous
people regardless of their other qualities and abilities.”19 In the words of
another, “a judge is more likely to reach
a just answer if he or she cares.”20
Caring does not mean giving everyone what they want (seldom possible),
or giving the most sympathetic party
what they want. A caring judge will
identify and take more opportunities to
act prosocially than would judges with
lesser levels of this trait, but salient
environmental constraints always
impose limits. A high-kindness judge
will forego certain kind acts — such as
forgiving a poor family’s crushing debt
— if doing so would violate their sense
of legal obligation, fairness, and ethics. However, that judge is likely still to
treat the parties with respect, express
compassion for the debtor, and explain
why she cannot grant that relief. Those
actions also are kind, and they benefit
both the debtor and the courts. The
procedural-justice values we hope a
good judicial temperament will promote have a home in this set of traits.
Positivity also would be expected
to heighten a judge’s work satisfac-
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tion and self-care. This judge is likely
to take pleasure where he or she can,
from days that feel like a triumph —
persuading appellate colleagues to
adopt a cherished position, or reuniting a child with a family — to ordinary
ones involving the smallest of victories
— clearing one’s six-month list, say, or
closing a case after a basically fair settlement. When things are hard and
the judge falls short, he may still be
able to think, “well, I did my best, and
tomorrow’s another day.” Frustrations,
sadness, and conflict abound in judging, and positivity and caring build a
precious commodity: resilience.
In selecting, evaluating, and supporting judges, we therefore should
value dispositional positivity, including
kindness. Strength in these traits will
help the judge withstand the impact of
the job, find available opportunities to
do good, and treat people well in the
process.
Negative emotionality is a minus.
In contrast, judges who are moderate
to high in the “negative emotionality”
family of traits would be predicted to
display undesirable judicial behaviors
— expressions of disdain, impatience,
closed-mindedness, and anger — most
consistently and in the greatest variety
of judicial work settings.21
Dispositional anger is likely the
biggest worry. It consists of a stable
tendency “to attribute hostile intent
in others’ actions, to perceive frustration in a variety of situations, and to
engage in continuous conscious pondering and rumination over one’s own
anger, as well as the perceived provocations of others”; such a profile also
entails greater frequency and intensity
of mood changes.22 These temperamentally “hostile and argumentative”
persons “tend to be vigilant for potential provocation from others, to initiate
and sustain arguments when provoca-
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tion is perceived, and to react angrily
when others’ behaviors are viewed as
hostile or rejecting.”23 Their behaviors
may beget a downward, self-justifying spiral. By expressing less warmth,
escalating, and engaging in “toxic
interpersonal behaviors” like use of
“contempt and sarcasm,” such persons
create conflictual situations, to which
they will then have characteristically
exaggerated responses.24
No clever argument is required to
drive home this temperamental profile’s destructive potential.25 Judges
who regularly indulge in over-the-top
anger displays are the frequent-flyers
of disciplinary complaints, as are those
who use insults, sarcasm, and humiliation to cement their power over
lawyers and parties. These behaviors
erode faith in the courts, and the damage does not stop there. Negativity can
close minds as surely as positivity can
open them. Left unchecked, anger can
curtail deliberation and increase punitive behavior, regardless of whether
it is relevant or justified — a particular danger for judges who feel it with
greater frequency and less justification. Moreover, high trait anger (that
is, being highly prone to anger) is bad
for judges’ health and increases substance abuse, affecting both work
performance and longevity.
Just like the high-kindness judge
who denies relief to the sympathetic
debtor, the high-anger judge may have
internalized reasons why she should
act in a manner inconsistent with her
own temperament (or “temperamentinconsistent”) — particularly if she is high
in self-regulation (on that, more anon).
However, trait anger will likely show
itself more than we might hope. First,
this profile generally entails increased
stress reactivity. Stress, which heightens temperament’s impact on behavior,
is a recurrent feature of judging; those

most affected by it would be expected to
act more regularly in a temperamentconsistent manner. Second, anger tends
to spur fast, unreflective action. This
property is a virtue when the anger is
well-placed, proportional, and effective in redressing a harm, but damaging
otherwise. Third, anger is an emotion
of power. Persons with power (like
judges) generally feel more free to
express it, particularly when directed
against those with less power (like lawyers, parties, and the public). Anger
displays also tend to elevate one’s perceived power, though this is more true
for men than women.26 Judges inclined
toward anger may find that judging
gives them particular license to express
it, and (particularly if they are men)
may come to enjoy the authority bump
it confers. Finally, constraints on even
frequent and extreme expressions of
anger, frustration, and disdain are few
and far between. Disciplinary proceedings remain rare, and their outcomes
often are mild; appellate courts generally are loathe to overturn cases on this
basis; and parties are expected to accord
judges deference even when they act
unreasonably.
Temperamental anger, then, represents a strongly negative mark on a
judge’s profile, certainly at high levels
of anger and likely even at moderate
ones. While this is unlikely to come as
a surprise, psychology highlights the
extent to which such a profile in judges
in particular may be both entrenched
and dangerous.
Psychology also illuminates a less
visible, less appreciated temperamental danger zone: high trait fear.
This profile involves stable tendencies toward “repressive or inhibitive”
emotions such as anxiety, “submissiveness, fear, sorrow, tenderness, and
disgust.”27 None of these feelings is
inherently problematic, though they

u
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are distressing. A judge who is not
disgusted by child pornography is profoundly out of touch; a healthy fear of
retaliatory violence can prompt needed
precautions; and some modicum of
motivational anxiety is arguably a job
requirement.28 The problems come at
high, perhaps only the highest, levels of this trait, and that is because a
highly fearful profile hinders development of courage.
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judging is no job for “timid . . . souls.”29
Judging requires courage, and courage
is temperamental.
In selecting, evaluating, and supporting judges, therefore, we should
be particularly concerned with dispositional negativity. High levels of trait
fearfulness threaten something desired
just as surely as high levels of trait
anger promise something undesired.

***

Self-regulation is
necessary because
emotions and the
behaviors they motivate
are not always in line
with our goals.
Although tributes to great judges
often laud their courage (like their kindness), courage is not generally thought
of as a temperamental quality. This is
a serious oversight. Judicial independence requires that judges be willing
to rule in ways that make enemies, and
that may anger, disappoint, or alienate
professional and social peers, powerful
constituencies, and fellow government
actors. Lower-court judges should take
the possibility of reversal into account,
but fearing reversal can stifle the
insight and industry that propel law’s
development and that give a sense of
agency and purpose. Extreme anxiety can paralyze judges when they
need to reach decisions and move on.
Fearlessness is not the goal: Courage is
the ability to act consistent with one’s
goals and values despite reasonable
fears. Chronic fearfulness and anxiety can overwhelm that capacity. As
Chief Justice Roberts has observed,

Let’s take stock. To possess a
generally good judicial temperament means, in part, to have
a relatively high propensity
to experience the emotional
states likely to express in desirable behaviors, and a relatively
low propensity to experience
the emotional states likely to
express in undesirable ones.
Judges high in trait positivity are
best positioned in this regard.
They are more likely to exhibit resilience and open-mindedness; to both
feel and project calm and patience; to
treat others with respect, understanding, and compassion; and to derive
pleasure from accomplishments both
large and small. In contrast, judges
high in trait anger are more likely to
feel and project anger, irritation, frustration, and contempt; to perceive
situations as personally arousing and
offensive; and to engage in aggressive
and disrespectful behaviors. Those
very high in trait fearfulness are less
likely to maintain the courage necessary to make difficult decisions and
may find it difficult to handle the position’s demands over time.
Emotional regulation traits
Having dug deeper into the implications of trait emotionality, let us now
examine self-regulation, just as critical
to judicial temperament. This second

temperamental axis captures the wide
variation in judges’ ability to shape their
emotional experiences, the thoughts
underlying those experiences, and the
actions those experiences motivate, in
light of judges’constraints and in service of their objectives.30 The most
advantageous profile is simply stated:
moderate to high levels of self-regulatory capacity are very good, and low
ones are very bad.
Self-regulation is necessary because
emotions and the behaviors they motivate are not always in line with our
goals. For example, a judge may have
to refrain from expressing impatience,
amusement, or a host of other emotions in order to satisfy professional
norms regarding a calm and impartial
demeanor. Persons high in self-regulation do not invariably seek to tamp
down emotion and its expression.
Rather, they work flexibly to influence
what emotions they have, when they
have them, and how they experience
and express them, using a variety of
strategies — for example, biting one’s
tongue, thinking differently about a situation, changing something about that
situation, or seeking guidance and support. Think of the sibling-judge who
interpreted the lawyer’s error as ineptitude rather than disrespect, masked
his disappointment with a smile, and
explained privately rather than barked
publicly: These are choices about
whether and how to self-regulate.
The challenges of judging require
a deep bench of these kinds of regulatory choices and skill in their
deployment. A judge may want to
refrain from showing emotion in some
situations (to prevent observers from
seeing what she thinks) but show it
in others (to encourage a defendant’s
progress in reentry court, or drive
home the seriousness of a lawyer’s
missteps). A patient, slow, even-toned
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response is often just what is needed
to calm a tense interaction, but will
not cut off an immediate danger, such
as a lawyer starting to reference inadmissible material. A judge may want to
adopt a caring, soothing tone with one
person (a frightened child witness or
overwhelmed clerk), but a clinical, cold
one with another (an expert witness
or appellate advocate who refuses to
stay on task). A difficult telephone call
with a colleague (requiring willpower
to initiate) may de-escalate a conflict,
whereas sending the sharply-worded
email that was satisfying to draft may
do the opposite.
Self-regulation is a sophisticated
improvisational dance, not one performed by stepping in numbered
outlines on the floor. Every judge needs
a moderate to high level of regulatory
skill to pull off this dance, and judges
weak in this domain will find that regulatory needs outpace capacity. Such
persons tend to rely unreflectively on a
narrow set of responses, regardless of
their goal-suitedness; to have greater
difficulty overriding impulses; and to
deploy suboptimal coping mechanisms
such as suppression and avoidance.
These differential regulatory patterns
impact situational success, personal
well-being, and adjustment to the
demands of life and work — and those
low in regulatory capacity fare worse
on each measure.
Strength in self-regulation therefore
should be prioritized in assessment of
judicial temperament.
Putting reactivity and
regulation together
One may ask whether self-regulation
is the more important temperament
axis. Imagine our sibling-judge who
stands at the ready to snap at perceived displays of disrespect. If she is
sufficiently high in self-regulation, we
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can imagine her noticing that she is
about to snap, and instead breathing,
deciding to interpret another’s misstep
as ineptitude rather than malice, putting on a calm smile, and engaging in
the same behavior as her higher-positivity sibling the next courtroom over.
If she is high enough on the regulatory
continuum, not only will she in this
instance look indistinguishable from
her sibling, but her skill could make the
difference between burnout and a long,
distinguished career. Ultimately, skillful regulation is less effortful, and less
costly, than poor regulation.
As trait negativity increases, we ideally would require a commensurately
higher quantum of regulatory capacity.
A sufficient regulatory counterweight
could move an otherwise problematic judge into acceptable territory.
But there are limits to what we can
ask. Consider the common automotive
analogy of reactivity as the accelerator and regulation the brake. More
accurately, regulation in this analogy
encompasses all the actions that determine a car’s accelerated movements,
including steering, downshifting,
speeding up, and braking. Brakes wear
out when overworked, and no amount
of steering (by an amateur, at least) can
get a speeding car safely around a tight
curve in the rain. Heavy reliance on one
half of the temperamental profile to
cabin the tendencies of the other may
get the job done in discrete instances,
but over the course of a judicial career
is an off-balance proposition. A judge
with a generally advantageous emotional-reactivity profile will need to call
on the most effortful forms of self-regulation somewhat less frequently.
Further, the stakes will be lower.
Every judge (indeed, every human)
experiences regulatory failure when,
predictably, stressors exceed coping
capacity. For the judge already prone

to anger or fear, the negative behaviors that express in such moments of
failure would be expected to be more
pronounced than those of their temperamentally positive counterpart.
More, such a polarized temperament profile is likely to be relatively
rare. Persons with lesser trait regulatory skill tend also to have particularly
disadvantageous sorts of trait emotionality: those with “the highest levels
of anger also have the lowest levels of
cognitive self-regulation,”31 as well as
lesser ability to reduce hostile feelings and override impulses to express
them. Strength in the kindness dimension, in contrast, is linked to strength
in effortful control.
As advantageous reactivity tends
to come clustered with advantageous
levels of self-regulation, and as the
opposite also is true, some judges will
be temperamental slam dunks (very
high positivity/very high regulatory
skill) while others will be air balls (very
high negativity/very low regulatory
skill). Most judges will not fall at these
extremes. We do not require perfection,
and so long as the judge is not an air ball,
we can tolerate more imperfection in
reactivity when regulation is sufficient
to pick up at least some of the slack.
MAKING THE MOST OF ONE’S
TEMPERAMENT
Thus far, we have focused on the temperament a judge brings to the bench.
This makes sense, as by middle age
what we see is (more or less) what
we get. However, people can and do
change. So can, and do, attributes of
their workplace. For the great many
judges who present with temperamental pluses and minuses, our approach
can be twofold. We can help them maximize advantageous qualities, and we
can sort them into the environments
u
to which they are best suited.
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Cultivating growth within the
envelope of possibility
Because we cannot hope for fundamental change, persons with stubbornly
disastrous temperaments — our air
balls — should not be judges at all.
However, it is hard to know which currently sitting judges fit into the air ball
category if we have not tried to find
the limit of their envelopes of possibility. Similarly, we will never know how
much better those with acceptable
temperaments could do if we have not
helped them stretch.
As between reactivity and regulation, regulation may be the better
target. Regulatory skill often continues
to grow over the life span, and regulatory-focused teaching interventions
have shown promise in other professional populations in high-stress jobs,
including doctors.32 If high-negativity/
low-regulation judges bring sufficient
other value to the bench or are too difficult to remove, it is worth investing
in strengthening whatever regulatory
skill they have. Further, the demands
of judging require even those with
regulatory strength to become stronger. Efforts to increase regulatory skill
always will add value.33
On the reactivity front, it is also
possible that the worst aspects of negative emotionality could be mitigated,
and the best aspects of positivity cultivated. Mindfulness practice, now
gaining traction in judicial education
circles, might help, as it can both reduce
the speed and intensity of reactions
and develop feelings of loving-kindness and gratitude.34 Psychological
interventions have shown promise in
reducing both felt and expressed anger
even among those high in that trait.
Sufficient investment in regulatory
strength might over time change the
emotional tendencies being regulated.
For example, if our high-negativity
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judge consistently decides to interpret lawyers’ missteps as poor skill
rather than insubordination, the less
emotionally triggering interpretation
might start to come more naturally.
Any program designed to help judges
find the most advantageous corners of
their envelopes of possibility will need
to be undertaken with care. Theories —
including this one — need to be tested,
tweaked, and sometimes fundamentally altered. Interventions can look
promising but ultimately show no
results. Programmatic fads come and
go. Here I simply plant a flag in a principle: Because some aspects of judges’
temperaments and how those temperaments express in behavior are at least
somewhat malleable, we should invest
in developing interventions that might
move some judges toward greater harmony with their job demands.
Judge and job: goodness of fit
In seeking that greater harmony, we
have to look at both judge and job. The
parameters of any given situation are
as important in determining how people will behave as are the traits they
bring to that situation. Borrowing
another foundational concept from
psychology, we need to think about
the “goodness of fit” between a judge’s
temperamental constellation and his
or her specific work environment. 35
Judging is not a standardized profession. Judges might work in the federal,
state, or municipal systems, be elected
or appointed, enjoy life tenure or work
under renewable contracts, earn relatively high or low salaries, hear trials
or appeals, sit in urban or rural settings, enjoy shabby or well-appointed
surroundings, have a general or specific jurisdiction, regularly or seldom
interact with the public, wield greater
or lesser docket control, and so on. The
parameters of any given judicial posi-

tion — its cultural norms, repetitive
tasks, recurrent stressors, mechanisms
of oversight, decisional constraints, and
daily rhythms — will interact with the
judge’s temperament with varying levels of harmony or discord. Some judges
will be temperamentally suited to many
sorts of judicial work, some suited only
to particular sorts, and others ill-suited
to most or all sorts. For example, a judge
with strong trait exuberance may be
a better fit with an active trial-court
assignment than a cloistered appellate
one. To withstand a child neglect and
abuse docket, a judge will need particularly high levels of trait positivity; one
with lesser levels may burn out quickly
with that docket, but be perfectly fine
handling patent cases. A judge with
moderately high levels of trait anger and
average regulatory skill might function
well in a role that has tightly controlled
contacts with the public, is buffered by
a highly collegial bench-and-bar culture
that reduces opportunities for conflict,
and is embedded in a judicial system
with clear and certain consequences for
discourteous and abusive behavior.
Judge and job thus must be assessed
interactionally. The lesser the distance
between judges’ dispositions and their
jobs’ demands for specific behaviors,
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the more likely judges are to satisfy
those demands with greater consistency and less effort. Goodness of fit
can also be enhanced by a court culture
and rules that make norm compliance
easier than its alternatives, and that
provide judges with adequate constraints, feedback, and support.
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construct, but we should take advantage of a chance to do better. Judicial
temperament is real. It deserves our
closest attention as we carry out the
high-stakes business of populating our
courts and delivering justice.

CONCLUSION
We long have been unable to think or
speak coherently about judicial tem-

perament. The psychology of human
temperament helps us construct a theoretically coherent account of judicial
temperament and a common language
with which to describe it. We are now
in a position to test, refine, and potentially alter the theory itself, and then
consider — with rigor — how to use
it to transform processes of judicial
selection, training, support, evaluation, discipline, and removal. There
is no quick, easy test of a complicated
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